Moving Target Defense for Hardening the Security of the Power System State Estimation

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ABSTRACT
State estimation plays a critically important role in ensuring the secure and reliable operation of the electric grid. Recent works have shown that the state estimation process is vulnerable to stealthy attacks where an adversary can alter certain measurements to corrupt the solution of the process, but evade the existing bad data detection algorithms and remain invisible to the system operator. Since the state estimation result is used to compute optimal power flow and perform contingency analysis, incorrect estimation can undermine economic and secure system operation. However, an adversary needs sufficient resources as well as necessary knowledge to achieve a desired attack outcome. The knowledge that is required to launch an attack mainly includes the measurements considered in state estimation, the connectivity among the buses, and the power line admittances. Uncertainty in information limits the potential attack space for an attacker. This advantage of uncertainty enables us to apply moving target defense (MTD) strategies for developing a proactive defense mechanism for state estimation.

In this paper, we propose an MTD mechanism for securing state estimation, which has several characteristics: (i) increase the knowledge uncertainty for attackers, (ii) reduce the window of attack opportunity, and (iii) increase the attack cost. In this mechanism, we apply controlled randomization on the power grid system properties, mainly on the set of measurements that are considered in state estimation, and the topology, especially the line admittances. We thoroughly analyze the performance of the proposed mechanism on the standard IEEE 14- and 30-bus test systems.

1. INTRODUCTION
In the electric power grid, state estimation (SE) is the process of finding the best estimate for the system state in a weighted least square sense, given a measurement model and a set of measurements acquired through a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. The ‘state’ corresponds to the vector of bus voltages, from which line currents and power-flows can be computed. State estimation solutions aid system operators in reliability assessment, initiating corrective control measures and enabling pricing calculations for real-time electricity markets. Hence, state estimation is a critical and inherent part of energy management system (EMS) applications for the power grid. However, critical infrastructures relying on SCADA based measurements are vulnerable to cyber-attacks [1]. It is worth mentioning that while phasor measurement units are gradually being deployed, the current grid still largely relies on extensive SCADA measurements for several EMS applications, including state estimation.

Recent work by [2] has revealed that state estimation is vulnerable to cyber-attacks, where adversaries can alter certain measurements by injecting false data to corrupt the estimation, but remain invisible to the system operator by evading the existing bad data detection algorithms. The key idea behind these attacks, called Undetected False Data Injection (UFDI) attacks, is as follows. State estimation uses high measurement redundancy to detect and filter bad or erroneous meter measurements by checking if the measurement residual (l2-norm of the difference between observed and estimated measurements) is below a certain threshold [3, 4]. An adversary who knows the complete measurement model can then manipulate meter measurements to be consistent with the measurement model to bypass the bad data detection (BDD) process [2]. While the extent of model accuracy on attacks is analyzed in [5], it is shown in [6, 7] that UFDI attacks, when adversaries have perfect knowledge, can be defended if a strategically chosen set of measurements are secured. However, due to the resource constraint issues with legacy equipment, securing those selected measurements might not always be feasible. Moreover, if

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General Terms
Security

Keywords
Power Grid; State Estimation; False Data Injection Attack; Moving Target Defense.
one or more secured measurements become unavailable, the correctness of the state estimation is again in question.

An undetected attack on state estimation has several constraints, particularly in terms of an adversary’s knowledge of the system and resources for achieving a desired attack outcome. The knowledge that is required to launch an attack mainly includes the measurements that are taken for state estimation, the grid topology (i.e., connectivity among the buses), and the admittances of the power lines [2]. Though partial information might still be sufficient to launch some attacks [5], [8], information uncertainty limits the potential attack space. We take advantage of this uncertainty to apply moving target defense (MTD) strategies for developing a proactive defense mechanism for state estimation.

In this work, we propose an MTD mechanism with the following objectives: (i) increasing the complexity for attackers by introducing uncertainty, (ii) reducing the window of attack opportunity (i.e., the attack space) for attackers, and (iii) increasing the attack cost (e.g., the number of measurements to be compromised). In our MTD mechanism, we randomize the set of measurements that are considered in state estimation and the topology with respect to the line admittances. The choice of a measurement set for state estimation is not unconstrained. The chosen set of measurements is restricted or when certain measurements are used to identify bad data. The condition \( |z - \mathbf{Hx}| > \tau \) implies the presence of bad data [4], \( \tau \) is set using a hypothesis test at a significance level. UFDI attacks [2] are based on the idea that if the attack vector \( \mathbf{a} \) is taken equal to \( \mathbf{H} \), then the residual remains unchanged, since \( z + a = \mathbf{H}(\hat{x} + e) \), the residual \( |(z + a) - \mathbf{H}(\hat{x} + e)| = |z - \mathbf{Hx}| \). The implicit assumption here is that the adversary has full knowledge of the measurement model \( \mathbf{H} \).

2.2 State Estimation and UFDI Attack

The state estimation problem is to estimate \( n \) power system state variables in \( \mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \cdots , x_n)^T \) based on a set of \( m \) measurements \( z = (z_1, z_2, \cdots , z_m)^T \) [4], according to the following relationship:

\[
\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{h}(\mathbf{x}) + \mathbf{e}
\]

Here, \( \mathbf{h}(\mathbf{x}) = (h_1(x_1, \cdots , x_n), \cdots , h_m(x_1, \cdots , x_n))^T \) and \( \mathbf{e} \) is the vector of measurement errors. In the case of the linearized estimation model (i.e., the DC power flow model), \( z = \mathbf{Hx} + \mathbf{e} \), where \( \mathbf{H} = (h_{i,j})_{m \times n} \). \( \mathbf{H} \) is known as the Jacobian matrix.

When the measurement errors are zero mean and normally distributed, the state estimate \( \hat{\mathbf{x}} \) is calculated as:

\[
\hat{\mathbf{x}} = (\mathbf{H}^T \mathbf{W} \mathbf{H})^{-1} \mathbf{H}^T \mathbf{W} \mathbf{z}
\]

Here, \( \mathbf{W} \) is a diagonal matrix whose elements are reciprocals of variances of the meter errors. Thus, estimated measurements are calculated as \( \mathbf{H} \hat{\mathbf{x}} \) and the residual \( |z - \mathbf{Hx}| \) is used to identify bad data. The condition \( |z - \mathbf{Hx}| > \tau \) implies the presence of bad data [4], \( \tau \) is set using a hypothesis test at a significance level. UFDI attacks [2] are based on the idea that if the attack vector \( \mathbf{a} \) is taken equal to \( \mathbf{H} \), then the residual remains unchanged, since \( z + a = \mathbf{H}(\hat{x} + e) \), the residual \( |(z + a) - \mathbf{H}(\hat{x} + e)| = |z - \mathbf{Hx}| \). The implicit assumption here is that the adversary has full knowledge of the measurement model \( \mathbf{H} \).

2.3 Attack Attributes

The UFDI attack model can be expressed with respect to a number of attributes of an attacker as follows:

- **Knowledge Limitation:** State estimation of a power system is done based on the topology of the grid and a number of power measurements taken on different lines and buses. For a successful UFDI attack, an attacker needs to know the connectivity among the buses and the electrical parameters (i.e., admittances) of the transmission lines [2], which is not trivial. The attacker also needs to know the set of measurements considered in state estimation.

- **Accessibility and Resource Constraints:** An attacker usually does not have access to all of the measurements, when physical or remote access to substations is restricted or when certain measurements are already secured. Additionally, an adversary may be constrained with respect to the cost or effort to mount attacks on measurements vastly distributed. In such cases, an adversary is limited to compromising or altering only a limited subset of measurements or buses. The extent of access is limited by the attacker’s resource limitations.

- **Attack Target:** An attacker may have a specific aim of corrupting the estimation of a certain set of state targeting a specific impact on the system.
2.4 Moving Target Defense

The idea of moving target defense (MTD) has been studied for a decade, especially in the field of cybersecurity [13]. Typical information technology systems operate in a static environment. Configuration parameters, such as IP addresses, DNS names, network topology, routing entries, security policies, software stacks, etc. remain mostly static over relatively long periods of time. When a system is static, attackers have enough time to know the configuration and behavior of the system, to understand the vulnerabilities and corresponding attack vectors, and finally, to launch attacks on the system. The same is true for cyber-physical systems like power grids, where the physical and cyber system are highly static, the operations are fixed, and the protocols are known.

Moving target defense is the concept of controlled change across multiple system dimensions in order to (i) increase uncertainty and apparent complexity for attackers, (ii) reduce their opportunity space, and (iii) increase the costs of their probing and attack efforts [14]. Usually, MTD is not meant to provide perfect security. The aim of MTD is to enable the operations to be executed safely in a compromised environment, where the system is defensible rather than perfectly secure. The potential of moving target defense mechanisms lies in being able to randomize or perturb one or more of the UFDI attack attributes. In this work, we devise a moving target defense mechanism considering the knowledge attribute, where we add uncertainty in the information by changing the set of measurements and the topology properties (i.e., line admittances). Even though, the attacker may still be successful in launching UFDI attacks, due to the uncertainty introduced by the MTD strategy, the attack space reduces.

3. MOVING TARGET DEFENSE AGAINST UFDI ATTACKS

In this section, we discuss the strategy of our MTD mechanism and the corresponding formal models.

### 3.1 Moving Target Defense Strategy

In order to increase the uncertainty of the attacker’s knowledge about the power grid system related to state estimation, our MTD mechanism takes two properties of the system: (i) the set of measurements considered in state estimation and (ii) the admittances of a set of lines in the topology. In the following we describe the ideas behind randomizing these properties.

#### 3.1.1 Changing the set of measurements

In regular practice, a fixed number of measurements are used in the state estimation process. According to the bad data detection algorithms, some of the measurements can be ignored in the process, if they are noisy enough (i.e., bad) relative to rest of the measurements. An adversary needs to know the set of measurements used in state estimation and alter a group of measurements from the set that are required to launch a specific UFDI attack. If the attacker does not know the measurement set correctly, he may not be able to identify this group of required measurements perfectly, i.e., one or more measurements can be missing in the group or included without necessity. Therefore, if we can randomize the measurement set used in state estimation by including a number of measurements from the unused (but possible) measurements, attackers knowledge about the measurement set becomes uncertain.

For an example, let us consider IEEE 14 bus test system [10], which has 14 buses and 20 lines. With respect to the DC power model, it is possible to have 54 measurements (considering forward and backward power flows through transmission lines and power consumptions at buses). Among these possible measurements, let us assume that a fixed set of 30 measurements are taken (recorded and reported using sensors/meters) for state estimation, while the rest (i.e., remaining 24 potential measurements) are not. According to our MTD mechanism, we can take a set of 7 measurements from the unused measurements by deploying...
measurement sensors there (if necessary). Then, from the total 37 measurements, we can select 30 measurements at random to be used in state estimation. However, the selected set must be capable of observing the system. Later in this section, we present a formal model of selecting a measurement set according to the observability requirement.

3.1.2 Perturbing line admittances

There are distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices, which can be deployed on transmission lines and are capable of performing active impedance (i.e., reactance) injection [15]. Leveraging this capability of D-FACTS devices, we consider the randomization of line admittances in our MTD mechanism. We assume that the admittance of a line can only be randomized if a D-FACTS device is deployed there. However, there are some limitations of using D-FACTS devices. Changes in impedance have impact on the power flows, which can easily impact the power system operations, e.g., the optimal power flow of the system [3].

In order to obtain the effect on the power flows due to the deliberate changes in impedance of power lines with the help of D-FACTS devices, a sensitivity analysis related to D-FACTS devices is thoroughly explained in [9]. In our MTD mechanism, we consider a feasibility constraint in changing line admittances, which ensures that the secured optimal power flow solution [3] remains the same in spite of the changes in the admittances, although some of the power flows may change. We also need to ensure that the changes cannot be very trivial. Further, all the lines with D-FACTS devices will not be randomized always. A set of lines among them will be chosen every time (i.e., with respect to each state estimation), and only admittances of these chosen lines will be changed. We assume that an adversary may know the actual admittance (i.e., base admittance) of each of these lines, though he does not know the change amount, and thereby, the changed admittance is assumed to be unknown to the adversary. We also assume that when a set of line admittances are changed, the previously changed admittances are returned back to the base admittances. As a result, at a particular time admittances of only the selected set of lines are unknown to the adversary.

Arguably power system operations personnel may not be willing to perturb line impedances for the exclusive purpose of detecting attacks. However, D-FACTS based perturbation of line parameters has been considered for minimization of power system losses and voltage control applications [9]. In practice, such line parameter changes could be leveraged for detecting attacks. In the rest of the paper, we illustrate the MTD through perturbation of line parameters as exclusively done for attack detection while keeping in mind that perturbation done for other optimization applications could be leveraged instead.

3.2 Formal Model for Strategy Selection

In Figure 1, we show the architecture of moving target defense mechanism. It is a combination of two modules, as shown in the figure: one for the arbitrary set of measurements selection for state estimation and another for the arbitrary set of lines selection for admittance randomization. In this section, we present the formal designs of these two modules. Different notations that we use in these models are shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>The number of buses in the grid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l</td>
<td>The number of lines in the grid topology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f_i</td>
<td>The from-bus of line i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e_i</td>
<td>The to-bus of line i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_i</td>
<td>The admittance of line i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g_i</td>
<td>Whether the admittance of line i is known.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_{L_i}</td>
<td>The power flow through line i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_{g_j}</td>
<td>The power consumption at bus j.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θ_j</td>
<td>The state value: the voltage phase angle at bus j.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>The number of potential measurements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>The number of potential measurements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a_i</td>
<td>If measurement i needs to be altered for the attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t_i</td>
<td>Whether potential measurement i is taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h_i</td>
<td>Whether the admittance of line i is perturbed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.1 Basic Power Model

Consistent with the DC power flow model, the admittance of a branch (i.e., line) is computed purely from its reactance. The direction of the line is assumed based on the current flow direction (i.e., from a end-bus to another end-bus). We denote the two end-buses of line i using f_i (from-bus) and e_i (to-bus), where 1 ≤ i ≤ l, f_i ≤ f, e_i ≤ b, l is the number of lines, and b is the number of buses. The admittance of line i is denoted by d_i. Each row of H corresponds to a power equation. The first 2l rows correspond to the line power flow measurements, while the rest corresponds to the power consumption measurements. To represent a power equation, we define P_{L_i} to denote the power flow through line i, P_{g_j} to denote the power consumption by bus j, and θ_j to denote the state value, i.e., the voltage phase angle at bus j. Parameter a_i denotes whether measurement i is required to be altered (by injecting false data) for the attack. We model incomplete information with respect to line admittance and use the variable g_i to denote whether the attacker knows the admittance of line i.

In the DC model, two measurements can be taken (i.e., recorded and reported by meters) for each line: the forward and backward current flows. These measurements are equal in magnitude but the opposite in direction. For each bus, a measurement can be taken for the power consumption at the bus. Therefore, for a power system with l number of lines and b number of buses, there are maximally 2l + b (i.e., m = 2l + b) number of potential measurements. Though a significantly smaller number of measurements are sufficient for state estimation, redundancy is provided to identify and filter bad data. We define t_i to denote whether potential measurement i is taken. Each row of H corresponds to a power equation. The first l rows correspond to the forward line power flows, while the second l rows correspond to the backward line power flows. The power flow of line i have the following relation with the states of the connected buses:

$$\forall 1 \leq i \leq l \quad P_{L_i} = d_i(\theta_{f_i} - \theta_{e_i})$$

(1)

The last n rows of H correspond to the bus power consumptions. The power consumption at bus j is simply the summation of the power flows of the lines incident to this bus. If L_{j,m} and L_{j,out} are the sets of incoming and outgoing lines of bus j, respectively, then the consumption is:

$$\forall 1 \leq j \leq b \quad P_{g_j} = \sum_{i \in L_{j,m}} P_{L_i} - \sum_{i \in L_{j,out}} P_{L_i}$$

(2)
Basically, state estimation is to find the voltage phase angle (θ) of each bus by solving the equations for all of the measurements (\(P_i^L\)s and \(P_j^B\)s).

### 3.2.2 Selection of Measurement Set

The power system is observable, when the measurements, each of which represent a power equation, must solve the (unknown) states. Therefore, we consider Equations (1) and (2) as constraints. Now, if a measurement is taken, it’s power flow or consumption measurement value assumed to be zero. That is:

\[
\forall 1 \leq i \leq L \quad (t_i \vee t_{i+1}) \rightarrow (P_i^L = 0) \\
\forall 1 \leq j \leq b \quad t_{2l+j} \rightarrow (P_j^B = 0)
\]

If the set of taken measurements can observe the system, when we consider each of them as zero, all of the states must be the same, i.e., the difference between the states of each connecting pair of buses should be zero. Therefore, if the system is not observable with this set, then there exists at least a pair of buses which have different states with respect to each other (i.e., nonzero difference). We find whether a set is observable using this contradiction. We take the following constraint that all of the states cannot be the same:

\[
\exists 1 \leq i, j, k \leq 1, i \neq j \neq k \quad \theta_{ij} \neq \theta_{jk}
\]

If there is no satisfiable solution to this model, then the set of measurements can observe the system.

### 3.2.3 Selection of Lines for Admittance Perturbation

In the selection of the lines and corresponding changes in admittances, the main constraint is that the changes need to be done such that the optimal power flow (OPF) cost does not increase. Specifically, our aim is to keep the generation dispatch as it is, i.e., according to the existing OPF, so that there is a minimum impact on the system operation due to the topology change.

The main constraint for OPF is that the total generation must be equal to the total expected load. Since we are not changing the demands at different buses, the required total generation remains the same. Now, the existing OPF solution can remain optimal after the admittance changes, if and only if the changed power flows still remain within associated transmission limits. Since all the power flow and consumption equations must hold, we consider them (i.e., Equations (1) and (2)) as constraints:

\[
\forall 1 \leq i \leq L \quad P_i^L = \hat{d}_i(\theta_{f_i} - \theta_{e_i}) \\
\forall 1 \leq j \leq b \quad P_j^B = \sum_{i \in L_j, m} P_i^L - \sum_{i \in L_j, o} P_i^L
\]

Here, \(\hat{d}_i\) is the changed admittance of line \(i\), such that \(\hat{d}_i = d_i + \Delta d_i\), where \(\Delta d_i\) is changes made on line \(i\). The admittance of a line can be changed only if D-FACTS devices are deployed. Therefore, considering that a line will be chosen for admittance change when necessary D-FACTS facility is installed there, we define \(h_i\) for denoting whether the line is chosen for admittance change. Then, the following constraint holds on \(\Delta d_i\):

\[
\forall 1 \leq i \leq l \quad \neg h_i \rightarrow (\Delta d_i = 0)
\]

If there is a change in the line admittance, the change cannot be very small so that the change does not have any impact. If \(R\) is the ratio of the minimum change over the line admittance, then we can express this constraint as follows:

\[
\forall 1 \leq i \leq l \quad h_i \rightarrow (\Delta d_i \geq R \times d_i) \vee (\Delta d_i \leq -R \times d_i)
\]

Each line has a capacity for the power flow, i.e., the maximum power that can flow through that line. Let \(P_{i,\text{max}}^L\) be the line capacity. Therefore:

\[
\forall 1 \leq i \leq l \quad P_i^L \leq P_{i,\text{max}}^L
\]

The change of a line’s admittance would be useful to hinder adversaries from launching an attack, if one or more measurements associated to this line are taken. It is worth mentioning that there are four measurements associated to a line: two (forward and backward) line flow measurements and two bus consumption measurements (at the end buses). Although the larger number of measurements is taken, the more benefit is supposed to be there, in this model, we consider the minimum case as a constraint, i.e., at least one of the measurements associated to the line needs to be taken:

\[
\forall 1 \leq i \leq l \quad h_i \rightarrow m_i \vee m_{i+1} \vee m_j \vee m_k
\]

The solution to this model verifies whether a given choice of admittance changes on a selected set of lines satisfy the constraints. This model can even synthesize all (or a number of) potential sets of lines for admittance randomization with changed admittance values.

### 3.2.4 Impact of MTD on Attack Attributes

The measurement set randomization: In order to launch a UFDI attack, i.e., changing the states of a group of buses, power flows through some lines and power consumptions at some buses are impacted (i.e., changed by \(\Delta P_i^L\) and \(\Delta P_j^B\) amounts, refer to the Appendix for the detailed formalization of UFDI attack constraints). The attacker needs to inject necessary false data to the measurements, i.e., meter readings associated to those power flows and consumptions. However, the attacker only needs to inject necessary false
data to a measurement $i$, when it is taken. That is:
\[
\forall 1 \leq i \leq l \ (\Delta P^L_i \neq 0) \rightarrow (t_i \rightarrow a_i) \land (t_{i+i} \rightarrow a_{i+i})
\]
\[
\forall 1 \leq j \leq b \ (\Delta P^B_j \neq 0) \rightarrow (t_{2j+k} \rightarrow a_{2j+k})
\]
The randomization of the set of measurements, considered in state estimation, make $t_i$ uncertain for the adversary.

**Perturbation of line admittances:** If the admittance of a line is unknown to the attacker, he cannot determine the necessary changes that she needs to make in the power flow measurements of the line. The condition is formalized as:
\[
\forall 1 \leq i \leq l \ (\Delta P^L_i \neq 0) \rightarrow ((t_i \lor t_{i+i}) \rightarrow g_i)
\]
Moreover, when the admittance of a line is perturbed (i.e., randomized), we also consider that the admittance is (now) unknown to the adversary, although the actual admittance (we call it as base admittance) of the line may be known to the adversary. Therefore, we take the following constraint:
\[
\forall 1 \leq i \leq l \ h_i \rightarrow \neg g_i.
\]

4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

We evaluate the performance of our proposed MTD mechanism with respect to successful UFDI attacks on different bus states. We use attackability, defined as the number of states which can be attacked (i.e., infected by UFDI attacks) over the total number of states, as the evaluation metric.

4.1 Implementation of Formal Models

In order to verify whether a successful UFDI attack can be launched against one or more targeted states, we encode the UFDI attack verification model [11] (see the Appendix for details) using satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) [16]. To execute the model, we use Z3, an efficient SMT solver [17]. By executing the model, we obtain the verification result as either satisfiable (sat) or unsatisfiable. When the result is sat, it specifies that there exists an attack vector satisfying the constraints regarding the attack attributes.

In order to implement a prototype of the proposed MTD mechanism, we again use SMT to encode the formal model of verifying whether a measurement set is observable (refer to Section 3.2.2). By solving this model using Z3, we generate a number of measurement sets to be used in state estimation. In our MTD mechanism, we randomly choose one among them following the uniform distribution. We also encode the formal model for the line admittance randomization that we present in Section 3.2.3. We first use the uniform distribution to select a subset of lines among the D-FACTS device deployed lines. Then, executing this model (in Z3) we figure out whether the admittances of these lines can be changed while satisfying all the necessary constraints.

4.2 Methodology

We evaluate the performance of our proposed moving target defense mechanism by analyzing the attackability under different scenarios considering access capabilities, knowledge limitations, and security measures. We evaluate the performance of our proposed MTD mechanism using IEEE 14-bus test system (Figure 2) [10]. It is consists of 14 buses, 20 transmission lines, and 54 possible measurements as shown in the figure. We also undertake evaluation using IEEE 30-bus test system for some scenarios to show the impact of the system size (i.e., the number of buses) on the performance.

In our evaluation, we mainly consider two kinds of adversaries: (i) naive and (ii) sophisticated. The first type of adversary as the name indicates is unaware of the MTD scheme. He believes that a fixed set of measurements is used in state estimation. The second type of adversary knows that the MTD mechanism is running at the grid operator’s side. As a result, in order to maximize his chances of a successful attack, he picks an attack vector that can cover as many potential sets of measurements as possible within his resource and access limits. For both kinds of adversaries, we consider the same resource constraints. An adversary can attack 13-15 measurements at a time, while these measurements cannot be distributed more than 7-8 buses of the system. We execute each evaluation experiment for at least 30 times and take the arithmetic average of them.

4.3 Evaluation Results and Discussion

4.3.1 Performance with respect to Accessibility

Figure 3(a) shows the attackability, i.e., the number of states that can be attacked out of the total, in three different cases with respect to the application of the MTD (i.e., defense based on our proposed MTD mechanism) and the adversary type. In the first case no MTD strategy is applied, while in the latter two cases the MTD is used but the
type of adversary is different. In the second case the adversary is naive, while in the third case he is sophisticated. In this set of experiments, only the MTD strategy of randomizing the set of measurements used for state estimation is applied. Here, we consider the 14-bus test system. We take 100 sets of 30 measurements arbitrarily chosen from 37 (taken) measurements. We vary the accessibility, i.e., access capability, of the adversary in the experiments from 50% to 100%. According to the experiment results, we observe that the attack success probability is always high when there is no MTD. In both of the cases of naive and sophisticated adversaries, the attackability reduces significantly. In the case of a sophisticated adversary, as would be expected, the attackability reduces less compared to a naive adversary. This is because the sophisticated adversary uses all of his resources to cover as many potential sets of measurements as possible, while the naive adversary only believes one particular set of measurements to be used in the state estimation process. The graphs in Figure 3(a) also show the impact of access capability of the adversary on the attackability. The results are obvious, i.e., the lower the adversary’s access capability, the better the performance of MTD strategy, which is able to reduce attackability down to 5% when the access capability is no more than 60%.

Figure 3(b) shows the attackability under different attack capabilities of the adversary as well. However, in this set of experiments, the MTD strategy of perturbing line admittances is applied along with the randomization of the set of measurements used for state estimation. We assume that D-FACTS devices are deployed on an arbitrary set of 5 lines, while only 2 lines are chosen among them for admittance perturbation at each time. According to the graphs in Figure 3(b), we can see that the MTD mechanism shows improved performance when we apply both of the MTD strategies. This performance improvement is nearly more than 10% with respect to the measurement set randomization based MTD alone.

In Figure 3(c), we present the performance of our proposed MTD mechanism in the case of the 30-bus test system by varying the attacker’s access capability. We observe the similar behavior in this case as well. Note that we have 30 states associated to 30 buses and we consider 100 sets of 65 measurements. Each of these sets are arbitrarily chosen from 80 (taken) measurements.

### 4.3.2 Performance with respect to Knowledge:

We evaluate the impact of the adversary’s knowledge limitation on the performance of the MTD. Again we consider
the same three cases, i.e., without MTD, MTD with naive adversary, and MTD with sophisticated adversary. Figure 4(a) shows the impact of knowledge limitation when only measurement based MTD strategy is applied (in the 14-bus system). We observe that when the adversary has limited knowledge, MTD strategies perform better. However, the impact of knowledge limitation is significant in the case of the sophisticated adversary. Since a sophisticated adversary leverages knowledge about the system and the MTD strategy in order to increase his attack success, when the knowledge is limited to less than 80%, his attack success drops significantly.

In the case of the MTD considering both randomization of the measurement set and perturbation of line admittances, we see similar behavior (see Figure 4(b) and Figure 4(c) for the 14- and 30-bus systems, respectively). The only difference is that the impact of limited knowledge is higher in this case. That is, the performance of the MTD increases with the decrease of the adversary’s knowledge and this increase is more significant when both MTD strategies are applied.

4.3.3 Performance with respect to Existing Security:

Figure 5(a) and Figure 5(b) show the impact of secured (i.e., data integrity protected) measurements on the performance of MTD in the case of the 14-bus system. Figure 5(a) shows the case when only measurement set randomization strategy is used and, and Figure 5(b) shows the case when both measurement set randomization and line admittance perturbation strategies are used. The more secured measurements the better is the performance of MTD strategies. Note that the measurements are secured arbitrarily, i.e., they are not secured optimally to achieve the best performance. Clearly the performance is better when both of the MTD strategies are applied, as evidenced by the graphs in the figures. We observe the similar behavior in the case of the 30-bus system (see Figure 5(c)).

5. RELATED WORK

The concept of undetected false data injection attack was presented in [2] for the first time, and was extended in [18]. The authors discussed UFDI attacks considering different scenarios, such as limited access to meters and limited resources to compromise meters, under random and specific targets, assuming that the adversary has complete information about the grid. In the general case, the attack vector computation problem is NP-complete. Therefore, the authors presented few heuristic approaches that can find attack vectors. UFDI attacks with incomplete or partial information are discussed in [5, 8]. These works mathematically showed the impact of incomplete knowledge on the potentiality of UFDI attacks. Several security metrics are proposed in [19] to quantify the importance of individual buses and the cost of attacking individual measurements considering the vulnerability of the communication infrastructure. In [20], authors claimed that an $l_1$ relaxation-based technique provides an exact optimal solution of the data attitude construction problem.

Some work has been done to defend state estimation from UFDI attacks. For example, Kosut et al. in [21] proposed a mechanism based on the generalized likelihood ratio test to detect UFDI attacks. Similar approach is found in [22] with the help of adaptive cumulative sum control chart test. Few other works proposed mechanisms to identify the optimal set of measurements to be secured to make UFDI attacks detectable. Bobba et al. in [6] showed that for detecting UFDI attacks it is necessary and sufficient to protect a set of basic measurements, which is actually a minimum set of measurements ensuring observability. Kim and Poor in [7] proposed a greedy suboptimal algorithm, which selects a subset of measurements that can be made immune from false data injection for the protection against UFDI attacks. In our recent work, we have addressed the problem of verifying stealthy attacks on state estimation by providing a comprehensive model of the attack attributes along with the impact of such attacks on the economic operation of the system [11, 23, 24]. In addition, in [24], we have devised a security architecture synthesis mechanism with respect to a given attack model and the grid operator’s resource constraints. Since the number of measurements to be secured is not so small, applying the group of security measures incurs substantial cost, especially due to the existing legacy hybrid system. Therefore, a cheaper and useful defense strategy like moving target defense (MTD) seems to be attractive.

MTD techniques have been presented for traditional enterprise networks in recent literature. Antonatos et al. proposed a network address space randomization scheme to offer an IP hopping approach that can defend against hitlist worms [25]. Duan et al. presented a proactive random route mutation technique in [26], which enables the random and simultaneous changes of the routes of the multiple flows in a network. However, to our knowledge, moving target based defenses haven’t received as much attention in SCADA and other control networks. In [27], Mo and Sinopoli proposed perturbing the input signal to a control system in order to detect replay attacks. Controlled perturbation of line admittances to detect UFDI was proposed in [28, 29]. Line admittance perturbation along with parameter estimation was shown to enhance the detectability of UFDI attacks on nonlinear state estimation in [30]. In this work, we go beyond line admittance perturbation and propose a multipronged, comprehensive MTD strategy where the measurements used in state estimation are changed along with the line admittances in a controlled fashion. The proposed approach is novel in this domain.

6. CONCLUSION

Securing state estimation against cyber-attacks is of paramount importance to maintain the integrity of the electric power grid. One way to secure state estimation from stealthy attacks like undetected false data injection attack is by securing a strategically selected number of measurements, which can be beyond the capability of the stakeholders. Therefore, a less expensive security solution like MTD mechanism that we have proposed in this paper is interesting. In this mechanism, we have applied randomization on the power grid system properties, particularly the set of measurements that is used in state estimation and the admittances of a set of lines. We have presented formal models to find the observable sets of measurements and the lines to randomize admittances. We have evaluated the performance of our mechanism on the standard IEEE test systems and have presented the results. We have found that our proposed MTD mechanism can reduce the attackability by 50%-60% compared to the situation when this mechanism is not applied. While a linear power system model with no losses was used here, a future direction of this work would be to extend...
the current solution to account for losses and eventually deal
with the inherent nonlinearity in power systems.

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In this equation, $\Delta P^f$ at bus power consumption measurement is required to change:

\[ \forall_{1 \leq i \leq n} P^f_i \rightarrow (\Delta P^f_i \neq 0) \]

From Equation (1), it is obvious that a change of $P^f_i$ is required based on the changes on state $f_i (\theta_{f_i})$ and/or state $e_i (\theta_{e_i})$. If in the case of false data injection, $P^f_i$, $\theta_{f_i}$, and $\theta_{e_i}$ are changed to $P'^f_i$, $\theta'_{f_i}$, and $\theta'_{e_i}$, then Equation (1) turns into the following:

\[ P'^f_i = d_i(\theta'_{f_i} - \theta'_{e_i}) \]

The subtraction of Equation (1) from the above equation represents whether there are changes in the measurements and the states. The resultant equation will be as follows:

\[ \Delta P'^f_i = d_i(\Delta \theta_{f_i} - \Delta \theta_{e_i}) \]

In this equation, $\Delta P'^f_i = P'^f_i - P^f_i = \Delta \theta_{f_i} = \theta'_{f_i} - \theta_{f_i}$, and $\Delta \theta_{e_i} = \theta'_{e_i} - \theta_{e_i}$. If $\Delta \theta_{f_i} \neq 0 (\Delta \theta_{e_i} \neq 0)$, then it is obvious that state $x_{f_i}$ ($x_{e_i}$) is changed (i.e., attacked). Similarly, we have the following equation that indicates whether a bus power consumption measurement is required to change:

\[ \forall_{1 \leq j \leq b} \Delta P^B_j = \sum_{i \in L_{j, in}} \Delta P^L_i - \sum_{i \in L_{j, out}} \Delta P^L_i \]

A.2 Formalization of False Data Injection

In order to launch an attack, the attacker must alter a set of measurements, which depends on the changes that are required to made on different power flows or consumptions. When $\Delta P_i^f \neq 0$, then it specifies that measurements $i$ and $l + i$ (i.e., forward and backward power flow measurements corresponding to line $i$), when they are taken (i.e., $t_i$ and $t_{i+l}$), are required to be changed. Similarly, the power consumption measurement at bus $j$ is required to change when $\Delta P_j^B \neq 0$. These are formalized as follows:

\[ \forall_{1 \leq i \leq t} (\Delta P_i^f \neq 0) \rightarrow (t_i \rightarrow a_i) \land (t_{i+l} \rightarrow a_{i+l}) \]

\[ \forall_{1 \leq j \leq b} (\Delta P_j^B \neq 0) \rightarrow (t_{2i+j} \rightarrow a_{2i+j}) \]

Conversely, measurement $i$ is altered, only if it is taken and corresponding power measurement is changed. The constraint is formalized as follows:

\[ \forall_{1 \leq i \leq t} a_i \rightarrow t_i \land (\Delta P_i^f \neq 0) \]

\[ \forall_{1 \leq i \leq l_{i+1}} a_{i+l} \rightarrow t_{l_{i}+1} \land (\Delta P_i^f \neq 0) \]

\[ \forall_{1 \leq j \leq b} a_{2i+j} \rightarrow t_{2i+j} \land (\Delta P_j^B \neq 0) \]

A.3 Formalization of Attack Attributes

Limited Information. If the admittance of a line is unknown to the attacker, then she cannot determine the necessary changes that she needs to make in the measurements associated to the line. We formalize this condition as follows:

\[ \forall_{1 \leq i \leq t} (\Delta P_i^f \neq 0) \rightarrow (t_i \lor t_{i+l} \lor t_{l+1} \lor t_{2i+1} \rightarrow g_i) \]

Moreover, when the admittance of a line is perturbed (i.e., randomized), we consider that the admittance is unknown to the adversary, although the actual admittance (we call it as the base admittance) of the line may be known to the adversary. The reason is that the changed amount is not known to the adversary. The following constraint addresses this point:

\[ \forall_{1 \leq i \leq t} h_i \rightarrow \neg g_i \]

Limited Capabilities. If a measurement is data integrity secured, then though the attacker may have the ability to inject false data to the measurement, the false data injection will not be successful. Hence, the attacker will only be able to change measurement $i$ in order to attack, if the following condition holds:

\[ \forall_{1 \leq i \leq m} a_i \rightarrow r_i \land \neg s_i \]

Limited Resources. The typical resource limitation specifies that, at a particular time, the attacker can inject false data to $T_{CB}$ number of measurements, at the maximum:

\[ \sum_{1 \leq i \leq m} a_i \leq T_{CB} \]

There can be a similar resource constraint with respect to the number of buses that need to be accessed in order to inject false data to the measurements residing at those buses. The following conditions identify the buses which need to be accessed:

\[ \forall_{1 \leq i \leq t} (a_i \rightarrow u_{f_i}) \land (a_{i+l} \rightarrow u_{e_i}) \]

\[ \forall_{1 \leq j \leq b} a_{2i+j} \rightarrow u_j \]

Let $T_{CB}$ be the maximum number of substations that the attacker can compromise simultaneously. Then:

\[ \sum_{1 \leq i \leq b} u_j \leq T_{CB} \]

Specific Targets. The attacker most often has a target of attacking a selected set of states. However, the attacker usually has no specification on the rest of the states. That is, an unspecified state might be attacked or not. If the target is to attack states 3, 5, and 6, then it is specified as follows:

\[ c_3 \land c_5 \land c_6 \]